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| Special Orders Number 152, MACV, 12 June 1965. (Document courtesy Richard P. Clark, Jr. Collection) |
The Army originally assigned Clark to the 1st Logistical Command, a subordinate unit of the US Army Support Command, Vietnam (later to be known as US Army, Vietnam), which was itself a subordinate unit under MACV. On his second day in Vietnam, a MACV personnel officer summoned Clark from a series of orientation briefings and informed him that the command had changed his orders. He would instead serve in MACV headquarters as Chief of Movements Branch, Transportation Division, J-4.[1]
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| Brigadier General John D. Crowley, U.S. Army. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army) |
Brigadier General John Denis Crowley, Jr., US Army, was the MACV assistant chief of staff for logistics (J-4), the principal staff officer responsible for all ammunition, construction, supply, maintenance, medical services, petroleum, and transportation in South Vietnam.[2] J-4 had three divisions in June 1965: the Material and Services Division, the Office of the Deputy for ARVN Military Assistance, and the Transportation Division. The Transportation Division was itself made up of three staff branches: Advisory Branch, Transportation Staff Branch, and Movements Branch.[3] Crowley’s staff had commenced one of the largest logistical buildups in history and found it difficult to accomplish its missions with existing personnel. The average workload per staff officer in J-4 had increased to eighty-four hours per week and Crowley needed experienced staff officers to meet MACV’s mushrooming logistical demands. J-4 began 1965 with forty-seven staff officers; by the end of the year, the staff section swelled to 342, the largest in the command.[4]
The Army had originally assigned Major Lloyd Milburn as chief of Movements Branch, but Milburn did not meet criteria established by the Defense Department in 1963 for assignment to key positions at MACV headquarters. All majors had to be either graduates or candidates for their service command and general staff colleges, and Milburn was neither. Crowley disapproved the assignment and requested the personnel files of other qualified incoming Army TC officers.
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| Major Lloyd Milburn, U.S. Army. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army) |
When Crowley reviewed Clark’s personnel file, he noticed that Clark was a member of the unofficial airborne fraternity within the Army officer corps. The MACV commander, General William C. Westmoreland, was an airborne artilleryman and assembled a senior staff whose experience closely resembled his. Almost every key staff officer at MACV was an Army airborne officer, including the deputy commander, Lieutenant General John Throckmorton; the chief of staff, Brigadier General William B. Rosson; the J-1 (Personnel), Brigadier General Ben Sternberg; the J-3 (Operations), Brigadier General William DePuy; and Crowley. Westmoreland’s deputies in turn filled their division and branch staffs with airborne colonels and majors. Crowley requested Clark’s assignment to J-4. [5]
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| Brigadier General William E. DePuy, left, the MACV J-3, and Lieutenant General John Throckmorton, right, the MACV deputy commander, confer. Note the airborne jump wings embroidered above each officer's US ARMY tape. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army) |
Ordinarily, the Department of the Army mandated a process that took several months and extraordinary circumstances before it changed an officer’s duty assignment. Westmoreland gave his generals carte blanche over personnel matters and it became MACV policy for senior staff to review personnel files of incoming officers and redirect those they wanted to the MACV headquarters, regardless of the officer’s original assignment. Some officers MACV transferred from headquarters assignments to the field protested through channels that eventually reached Army Chief of Staff Johnson. When Johnson questioned Westmoreland about MACV’s personnel practice, Westmoreland explained that some key assignments at MACV required officers with special qualifications. As the buildup progressed, he argued, MACV had to give a higher priority to headquarters requirements since staff planning had to precede the buildup. Johnson reluctantly let the theater commander have his way.[6]
Major General Henry Del Mar, an Army TC officer in Vietnam in 1966, claimed Westmoreland’s personnel policies undermined the war effort. “When an operating agency is located in a headquarters that's in the field,” Del Mar said, “the top headquarters should not have the prerogative to research anyone coming in theater --- first, by the top headquarters, which at this point was MACV; second, by USARV. They would look at all the files coming in. By the time you got anybody, the operating agencies out in the field that desperately needed talent and people, were the last guys on the totem pole. I operated the 124th [Transportation Battalion] when I arrived, but didn't have an operations officer and I didn't have a deputy. Here was a 24-hour a day operation with no deputy. I don't know how long it was, and it was difficult to get stevedore officers. You had to fight for them but in the headquarters they rarely had any shortage. That condition should not be allowed; priority should go to the people that are out in the field operating, not the staff agencies.”[7]
Movements Branch was located at MACV II, an old French cavalry compound hidden behind a grove of trees along Tran Hung Dao Street, a wide boulevard that connected downtown Saigon with Cholon. As MACV expanded in early 1965, Westmoreland reorganized the headquarters and moved the J-4 staff across town to this secondary location. Crowley kept his offices at MACV I, which made J-4 staff coordination cumbersome, time consuming, and created communication and security problems for the men who served him. The separation also conveyed an implied message that Westmoreland and Crowley disdained logistics and logisticians.
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| MACV II Headquarters, 606 Tran Hung Dao Street, Saigon, South Vietnam, 1965. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army) |
When Clark first reported for duty on 10 June 1965, his branch consisted of ten officers and enlisted men, metal desks and chairs, clattering mimeograph machines and typewriters, a Dictaphone machine, heavy steel file cabinets, and more than a dozen ringing telephones. A typical day found Clark’s IN box piled with a foot-high sheaf of paper when he arrived at work in the quiet of the morning. He hardly had a chance to read the first document, much less write anything, before the phones began ringing. Soon he found himself juggling four different phone calls in four different time zones from four different agencies with four different problems. At the same time, his subordinates juggled their phone calls and their voices struggled to be heard above the din of which he was very much a part.
MACV created Movements Branch in the fall of 1962, when Crowley’s predecessor, Brigadier General Frank A. Osmanski, directed his staff to plan an agency within J-4 that would “equitably allocate” transportation resources among users and operators. He stipulated that the agency be headed by a movement control officer with a rank of major or lieutenant colonel, and staffed with a small section of about twelve officers and enlisted men, “to give us the professional supervision this operation requires without creating another little empire.”[8]
In October 1962, the J-4 staff responded by issuing MACV Directive 42, which created a Movements Branch within J-4 that functioned as a movement control unit and a joint transportation allocations board. From October 1962 until March 1966, Movements Branch coordinated and allocated all intra-theater sealift and airlift. The branch chief communicated directly on transportation matters with MACV’s component commanders and their subordinate units, installations, and activities. Movements Branch was the contact point for passengers traveling on railways, inland and coastal waterways, troop carrier and cargo airlift transportation. The branch arranged for movement of people and cargo, and advised and assisted both shippers and receivers to ensure that transport capability was used effectively. It operated airlift and sealift coordinating centers and coordinated with terminal operators to control cargo movement. Movements Branch also was the contact point for matters of mutual interest between the US Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) and the US Military Airlift Command (MAC), pertaining to transportation support of MACV.[9]
Sixteen different military and civilian agencies submitted their estimated transportation needs to Movements Branch at least twenty-five days before each new month, and the branch then estimated its capabilities. Ten days later, the chief of movements convened his staff, decided on allocations and developed a tentative schedule for the following month. When users submitted transportation requests to Movements Branch, the branch chief assigned priorities to each shipment that ranged from priority one (emergency) through priority four (not urgent). Within the same priority, the items longest in the system moved first.
Each day, movement requests consolidated at Clark’s desk. His staff at the Airlift Coordination Center (ALCC) and the Sealift Coordination Center (SLCC) brought him up-to-date data showing the backlogs of routine cargo awaiting movement at each location, along with information on the operational status of available transportation. Clark was the final adjudicator when someone had to make difficult choices between movements of equally stated priority. After Clark validated requirements and allocated transportation, he and his staff scheduled airlift and sealift missions. Movements Branch published daily schedules by four every afternoon, which in non-emergency situations permitted aerial and sea ports to prepare loads.
Within a month of taking over as chief, Clark discovered serious flaws in Directive 42 that prevented Movements Branch from providing responsive and efficient transportation allocation and movement control. The flawed directive also made Movements Branch a lightning rod for controversy and criticism. The Army Transportation Corps’ principles of movement control in the 1960s carefully defined responsiveness and efficiency. Responsiveness referred to the movement control officer’s timely reaction to a lift request. Efficiency referred to the movement control officer’s economy of movement in ensuring that payload per movement is kept at a high level. When transport capacity exceeded lift requirements, movement control officers emphasized responsiveness because there was reserve capacity for inefficient movements. When transport capacity fell below lift requirements, movement control officers emphasized efficiency to keep as much cargo flowing to users as possible, albeit at a less responsive rate.
In theory, Directive 42 balanced the responsiveness of a regular movement schedule with an efficient allocation of movement tailored to the movement control officer’s capacity and the customer’s requirements. Clark programmed some daily scheduled cargo and passenger movements over the same air and sea routes. The scheduled movements were responsive because the customers knew exactly when and where to expect delivery, but inefficient because cargo and passenger requirements fluctuated from day to day and resulted in periods of underutilization. Conversely, the allocation system assigned movements to specific requests submitted by customers. Allocation of movement was less responsive because customers had to coordinate movement requests well in advance, but theoretically efficient because Movements Branch could tailor missions to assure maximum utilization of transport capacity. In practice, overall efficiency suffered because of conditions at air and seaports in South Vietnam. Maintenance, refueling, port crew operations delays, aircraft overcrowding, taxiway saturation, weather conditions, enemy action, and airfield closures frequently disrupted the movement system and resulted in reduced tonnages and dissatisfied customers.
Brigadier General William Eugene DePuy, the assistant chief of staff for operations (J-3), demanded absolute responsiveness to tactical and emergency movement requests and was indifferent to overall responsiveness and efficiency. DePuy described himself as “impatient,” a man “trying to make things happen, usually unsuccessfully, not wanting to be told things aren’t working well.” He told Clark what he wanted moved and when he wanted it moved. If Clark contradicted him, DePuy interrupted Clark with a curt, “that’s wrong.”.[10] DePuy snapped that while he was J-3 operational requirements were superior to, and dictated, logistics. Transportation limitations would not govern his strategic and tactical plans. [11]
Clark had little choice but to comply. Directive 42 did not specify procedures for immediate responses to emergency or tactical requests. While Clark was chief of movements, most tactical airlifts resulted from an on-call request with an advance notice of less than twenty-four hours. When Movements Branch emphasized responsiveness, tactical customers received on-time deliveries while logistic users did not, and overall responsiveness and efficiency suffered. Logistic users eventually discovered the loophole in Directive 42 and began to submit their own on-call and emergency movement requests. Movements Branch’s daily process of matching immediate requirements against existing capabilities overshadowed the allocations process specified in the directive, and because of his many other responsibilities, Clark was unable to critically scrutinize all users’ requests or exaggerated priorities. [12]
DePuy explained how his operational philosophy impacted overall responsiveness and efficiency: “Generally speaking, though, during the time that I was there [1965-1966], we were a little thin on the logistics side. The best example of that came from a meeting I used to chair every morning in Saigon. The first report I always got was on the backlog of our tactical intra-theater airlift, C-130s and C-123s. That backlog would go up, and up, and up, whenever we ran an operation. Then, we would work that backlog back down by stopping all major operations. After doing that, we again would be able to move the 173rd or the 101st, or the Vietnamese, and support another operation during which the logistic backlog once again would grow.”[13]
Osmanski complained that DePuy rarely asked logistical officers for advice when his staff planned operations, which resulted “in the plans being imposed from the top.”[14] Another MACV J-4, Major General Raymond Conroy, similarly criticized DePuy’s methods: “You don’t call your J-4 in three days before an operation and ask him if he can support you and you’ve had your staff working on it for five months. You get him in the game early and that is the only way.” A more experienced J-4 than Crowley might have challenged DePuy and Westmoreland on Clark’s behalf and preserved the integrity of the movements system. But, as Clark noted in his diary, Crowley was “poorly qualified in transportation,” and ignored the magnitude of cargo that backlogged at the aerial port at Tan Son Nhut and the seaport at Saigon.[15]
Movements Branch utilized airlift and intra-coastal sealift to transport the majority of cargo and troops within South Vietnam. The major aerial ports operated on an around-the-clock seven-day-a-week basis. The limiting factor in airlift operations was the lack of all-weather fields capable of landing jet transports. In 1965, there were only six jet-capable air bases in South Vietnam. The largest, and most developed, was Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. Every day, 1,000 to 1,400 incoming and outgoing flights passed through the world’s busiest air terminal. Logistical airlift moved most mail, high-value or emergency items, perishable foods, and passengers. Movements Branch scheduled daily flights that linked the major bases and reduced normal aerial port cargo backlogs. Movements Branch blended logistical and tactical airlift to base areas and operating locations, some of which were inaccessible to surface transportation.[16]
Movements Branch assigned airlift missions to the US Air Force’s 315th Troop Carrier Group, which flew C-123 Provider and C-130 Hercules aircraft.[17] In December 1965, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, the Pacific commander, increased the number of C-130 aircraft assigned to transport in South Vietnam from tenty-two to twenty-nine.[18] As in-country transportation requirements grew, US Air Force, Pacific (PACAF) deployed additional C-130s to MACV through a temporary duty arrangement in which crews and aircraft rotated to South Vietnam for a two-week period. By the time Clark’s tour of duty ended in June 1966, forty-four C-130s rotated to bases at Saigon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. Airlift capability was augmented by one US Army CV-2B Caribou company, two US Air Force C-123 squadrons, and six Royal Australian Air Force CV-2B aircraft. Movements Branch rarely experienced aircraft shortages since Pacific Command made additional aircraft readily available to MACV. However, air passenger traffic, estimated at 20,000 persons per month but averaging 80,000 passengers monthly by June 1965, threatened to decrease available airlift for supply movements.[19]
In the summer of 1965, MACV increased its tempo of combat operations and placed a greater demand on emergency tactical airlift. Movements Branch relied on intra-coastal sealift to maximize airlift capability and to move the bulk of cargo from Saigon to up-country locations. Seven Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs), on loan from the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), moved cargo from Saigon to Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. The LSTs were naval landing craft that carried approximately 500 short tons of cargo; its bow doors and ramps allowed crews to beach and discharge cargo directly onto the shore. The ships’ crews discharged cargo over the beach, where South Vietnamese stevedores loaded the supplies onto trucks and transported the cargo to users. LSTs also perfomed inter-coastal sealift of construction supplies, equipment, and US Air Force ammunition from Pacific Command logistic bases in Okinawa and the Philippine Islands to up-country locations in South Vietnam.
In World War II and Korea, the Army transported the vast majority of its supplies by railroad. In 1965, MACV in Vietnam moved only 30,201 tons of cargo on rail cars.[22] The Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS) was a rail network that connected the city of Hue to Saigon along a route that paralleled the South Vietnamese eastern coastline. It was, however, a railway system in name only. Its tracks were in disrepair, its roadbeds were unsafe in many places, the Viet Cong controlled and sabotaged its rights-of-way, and its rolling stock was an antiquated relic of early-twentieth century French colonialism. Moreover, the few operable sections of the VNRS were of limited value since they often led from nowhere to nowhere. Both the South Vietnamese government and MACV wanted to restore the VNRS for economic and military reasons. The most formidable obstacle to restoring the VNRS was the Viet Cong. The VC destroyed rails and bridges faster than MACV or the South Vietnamese government repaired them. Although Clark thought the VNRS was undependable and dangerous, the pressure to reduce MACV’s dependence on airlift and sealift compelled him to experiment with limited rail movement.[23] In October 1965, US military cargo moved over the VNRS for the first time over short sections linking Saigon to Bien Hoa, Nha Trang to Phan Rang, and Da Nang to Hue. Maximum rail capacity at the end of 1965 was almost 1,000 tons of military cargo per week. By the time Clark left Vietnam in June 1966, the VNRS operated from Hue to Da Nang, Ninh Hoa to Nga Ba, Nga Ba to Thap Cham, Thap Cham to Dalat, and Xuan Loc to Saigon.[24]
Road transport was similarly limited in South Vietnam. Outside of major cities, the Viet Cong controlled most of the roads and US truck convoys were always subject to VC ambush. The monsoon season also flooded most up-country roadways for days at a time. Many of the roads in South Vietnam were not of suitable construction or quality for substantial military traffic. During 1965, the Viet Cong closed Route 1, the major north-south artery, in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, and Dinh Tuy provinces. Guerrillas also shut down Route 9 in Quang Tri province and Route 14 in Kontum, Pleiku, and Quang Dun provinces. VC units closed Route 19 west of Pleiku; Route 7 in Phu Yen province, and Route 11 in Tuyen Duc province. Pockets of Viet Cong resistance halted traffic on Inter-provincial Route 1 in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces, and Route 20 in Long Khanh and Lam Dong provinces; Provincial Route 10 was closed in Hau Nghia province. The limited availability of South Vietnam’s road network prevented Army TC truck units from conducting long-haul missions and instead used short-haul truck transport to support port and beach clearance within US bases.[25]
During 1965, Clark’s staff section planned and programmed the short-haul movement of more than 1,000,000 tons of cargo over Vietnam’s roads. By the end of the year, fifteen Army TC truck companies operated from coastal logistical bases in South Vietnam and transported 15,360 tons of cargo and 2.4 million gallons of fuel daily via secure lines of communication. Movements Branch augmented the Army truck companies with South Vietnamese civilian trucking contractors.[26]
The Movements Branch staff compiled statistical data that defined relationships among the transportation modes. In-country cargo and passenger movements while Clark was chief of Movements Branch, expressed in tons, were as follows:[27]
Air Sea Land Rail
June 18,000 85,000 87,000 1,200
July 20,000 93,000 97,000 2,000
August 26,000 88,000 101,000 1,000
September 28,000 87,000 98,000 3,200
October 31,000 82,000 95,000 2,500
November 30,000 73,000 100,000 2,500
December 40,000 73,000 101,000 2,000
Clark became chief of movements just as the Viet Cong began a series of offensive operations against South Vietnamese and US base camps. On the night of 9 June, the VC attacked a South Vietnamese and US Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai, some forty-five miles north of Saigon. During three days of fighting that followed, the Viet Cong ambushed two waves of airlifted South Vietnamese reinforcements and inflicted more than 650 casualties. Westmoreland tried to convince Sharp that the South Vietnamese army was on the verge of collapse and only the commitment of US combat forces could save South Vietnam. At one point in the battle, Westmoreland considered the situation so serious that he alerted elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and sent Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, the Pacific commander, an urgent cable stating he might have to commit the paratroopers to the battle.[28]
Sharp was appalled. He telephoned and cabled Westmoreland to remind him that an American defeat at that point in the war, “particularly in the immediate wake of adverse publicity on the subject,” might embarrass the president and “jeopardize or change the course of our present plans regarding the use of US forces.” He suggested that Westmoreland use air power instead of troops to relieve the camp. Sharp also ordered Westmoreland to notify his superiors in the chain of command before he committed US troops to combat. Sharp’s caution was well advised. War correspondents in Saigon watched for any sign that US forces might take the offensive. The reporters used commercial telephone lines that were subject to enemy monitoring to inform their editors. Westmoreland initially followed Sharp’s advice and drove the enemy back with air attacks. He also sent a series of back-channel messages to the JCS and McNamara requesting permission to commit US troops to combat.[29]
DePuy and Crowley ordered Clark to suspend all scheduled air movements while senior leaders in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington decided whether to withdraw or reinforce Dong Xoai. The battle at Dong Xoai had been a local fight, yet the decision on whether or not to hold a South Vietnamese rural village became a crisis that required input from MACV, Pacific Command, the Pentagon, and the White House. After he deliberated with his Cabinet for three days, President Johnson approved Westmoreland’s request to airlift elements of the 173rd to defend the airfield at Phuoc Vinh, near Dong Xoai. Meanwhile, millions of pounds of cargo accumulated at Saigon’s aerial port.
[1] Personnel File of Colonel Richard Paris Clark, Jr., US Army (Retired), 078763, National Military Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri.
[2] MACV General Order No. 2, 30 March 1962; Letter, MACV, No. 01562, 30 November 1965, Subject: JTD, Headquarters Staff, Headquarters USMACV, 15 November 1965.
[3] MACV Organization and Functions Manual, 15 December 1965.
[4] History, MACV, 15 October 1965, Subject: USMACV Command History.
[5] Interview, Brigadier General Ben Sternberg, MACV J-1, May 1965. File MACV Historical Branch; Personnel File of Colonel Richard Paris Clark, Jr., US Army (Retired), 078763, National Military Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri.
[6] MACV Directive 672-1, 1 September 1964; General Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, 3 October 1965.
[7] Interview, Major General Henry Del Mar, by Captain Kevin M. Cale, 22 August 1985. US Army Transportation Oral History Program, Transportation General Officer Interviews, Biggs Library and Information Center, US Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
[8] MACV Directive 42, 8 October 1962.
[9] MACV Organization and Functions Manual, 15 December 1965.
[10] William E. DePuy, “Remarks to the Army Museum Conference,” 16 April 1974, Historical Office, US Army TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
[11] General Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, MACV Military History Branch, 22 January 1966.
[12] General Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, MACV Military History Branch, 22 January 1966.
[13] Lieutenant Colonel Ronnie L. Brownlee and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Mullen III, “Changing An Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired”, (United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1986), 135.
[14] Interview, Brigadier General Frank A. Osmanski, MACV J-4, 4 February 1965, MACV Military Historical Branch.
[15] RPC Diary, 5 September 1965.
[16] Message, DOP 51048, US Air Force Pacific to 7th Air Force, 170005Z, 17 July 1966; Fact Book, Headquarters MACV, Secretary of Defense Visit to Vietnam, 10-14 October 1966; Planning Document, MACV, Concept of Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1 September 1965.
[17] Ibid.
[18] MACV J-4 Monthly Historical Summary, 15 January 1966.
[19] Interview, Brigadier General Frank A. Osmanski, MACV J-4, 4 February 1965, MACV Military Historical Branch.
[20] Message, COMUSMACV to COMSTSFE, 170438Z December 1965; Message, COMSTSFE to COMUSMACV, 180551Z December 1965; Message, COMSTS to COMUSMACV, 181750Z December 1965; Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 041042Z December 1965; Message, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 150437Z December 1965; Message, CINCPAC to COMSTSFE, 181735Z December 1965.
[21] Message, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160105Z November 1965; Message, COMUSMACV to SECDEF, 230600Z November 1965; Message, CINCPAC to SECDEF, 280050Z November 1965; Memorandum, MACV, 8 December 1965, Subject: Staff Conference Notes; OER, LTC Richard P. Clark, Jr., 8 April 1966.
[22] Interview, J-4 Transportation Division, by Captain E. Gregory, MACV Military History Branch, 19 January 1966.
[23] Letter, MACV J-4, 19 February 1965. Subject: Status of Vietnamese Railway System.
[24] MACV J-4 Logistics Briefing, 11 January 1966.
[25] MACV J-4 Logistics Briefing, 11 January 1966; MACV Weekly Summary, 25 December 1965 to 1 January 1966.
[26] Interview, J-4 Transportation Division, by Captain E. Gregory, MACV Military History Branch, 19 January 1966; MACV J-4 Logistics Briefing, 11 January 1966.
[27] MACV J-4 Logistics Summaries, January-December 1965.
[28] Messages, MACV 19118 to CINCPAC, 7 June 1965; COMUSMACV 3077 to CINCPAC, 13 June 1965.
[29] Memo, MACV for Westmoreland, 13 June 1965, subject: Telephone Call from Admiral Sharp, CMH Msgs, Sharp to Westmoreland, 13 June 1965, WH; Saigon to NMCC, 13 June 1965.
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